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1. Introduction
It is a well-established fact that ubiquitous computing (UbiComp) raises a whole
new set of challenges with respect to fundamental security aspects such as
secrecy and privacy (e.g. the UbiComp Grand Challenge as formulated in
Sloman (2006)). Many new features of UbiComp (virtual anonymity, scalability,
mobility, autonomy, ubiquity, incomplete information, global connectivity, etc.)
will affect our notion of security requirements. As an example, a mobile computing
entity may ﬁnd itself in a hostile environment, disconnected from its preferred
security infrastructure, e.g. its usual certiﬁcation authorities, and the autonomy
requirement means that even in this scenario, it must be able to assign privileges
to other UbiComp entities; privileges that are meaningful based on usually
incomplete information the assigning entity has about the assigned entity.
One particular attempt addressing these challenges builds on the intuitively
appealing idea of building a security framework for UbiComp resembling the web
of trust, which we all use in our daily communication with, for example, institu-
tions, companies and other human beings. This has led to a growing research ﬁeld
sometimes referred to as computational trust.
To be more speciﬁc, computational trust builds on abstractions inspired by the
human concept of trust, which aims at supporting decision making by
computational agents in the presence of unknown, uncontrollable and possibly
harmful entities and in contexts where the lack of reliable information makes
classical techniques useless.
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experience, trust appears in several very different forms, from description and
speciﬁcation languages to middleware, from social networks and management of
credential to human–computer interaction. These rely in different degrees on a
variety of underpinning mathematical theories, including, e.g. logics, game
theory, semantics, algorithmics, statistics and probability theory.
Computational trust was originally introduced as an alternative to traditional
security technologies in trust management (Blaze et al. 1999b). This approach
still provides an important class of applications where, for example, access to
information or resources is based on a provider’s trust in the requesters.
However, within UbiComp computational trust deals not merely with access
control, but more generally with decision making by computational agents
in the presence of unknown, uncontrollable and possibly harmful entities. This is
the case for, for example, the autonomous selection by a requester of (apparently
similar) services based on its trust in particular providers. Such decisions may
also affect security: interaction often entails exposing personal data, as well as
requiring resources such as time, computation, battery and storage.
Within computational trust, several applications have been constructed with
truly impressive experimental performance. However, we are not yet in a position
where we understand why, when and how a particular approach is applicable, as
expressed in Sabater & Sierra (2005). Such questions are typically formulated in
terms of underlying models. Many models for computational trust have been
proposed, but it is hard to identify one model (or even a few) accepted widely by
the research community. Unfortunately, the lack of widely accepted formal
models leads to a lack of clarity about the exact objectives of proposed systems; as
Samuel Karlin was quoted to have said in a tribute lecture to honour R. A. Ficher:
‘The purpose of models is not to ﬁt the data but to sharpen the questions’.
Our position is ﬁrst of all that within computational trust we need to sharpen
our questions, in the sense that within any approach to computational trust,
it should be possible to ask and to answer formally questions on the behaviour
of systems. This applies, of course, to any piece of software, and a wealth of
literature exists under headings such as software speciﬁcation, analysis and
veriﬁcation. However, most of this builds on a simple correctness approach, in
the sense that questions above are formulated as yes/no questions. This makes
perfect sense for many software systems, but it is our position that in the setting
of computational trust, we need to develop new formal frameworks for a more
general notion of correctness, which allows us, for example, (i) to express and to
argue how well a particular system behaves under various assumptions about the
environments (i.e. in which application scenarios does the system do well?) and
(ii) to express and argue how robust a particular system is with respect to
changes in the environment.
In this paper, we ﬁrst give a brief survey of some of the systems and models for
computational trust, which have been studied in the literature, and which we
ﬁnd particularly relevant for a discussion of our positions above (based on
Krukow 2006).
We then illustrate some preliminary attempts towards a new approach to
correctness as introduced above. This is presented within formal probabilistic
models, in which we sketch ideas towards a theoretically well-founded technique
for comparing probabilistic systems in various different environments.
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It is not our intention to survey the entire collection of works on trust in
computer science; this is too comprehensive, and excellent surveys already exist
(e.g. Grandison & Sloman 2000; Ramchurn et al. 2004; Sabater & Sierra 2005;
Jøsang et al. 2006). Also, the PhD thesis of Abdul-Rahman (2005) contains a vast
survey (mostly) of the human notion of trust in computer science, including
insights from social sciences.
So, here we only focus on a few of the systems and models which we ﬁnd
particularly relevant for our discussion on computational trust within UbiComp.
However, we should mention that there is a whole different strand of research on
trust distinct from the more technical notions on which we focus, which has
resulted in the term ‘trust’ being overloaded within computer science. This other
strand deals with a computational formalization of the human notion of trust, i.e.
trust as a sociological, psychological and philosophical concept. However, the
human concept of trust is elusive and its many facets make it hard to deﬁne
formally (Marsh 1994; Cahill et al. 2003). We believe that to live up to the
UbiComp challenge, it is necessary that the two concepts be merged in a ‘uniﬁed’
theory of trust that combines the strengths of both notions. To be more precise,
our ideal would be to combine the rigour of traditional trust management with
the dynamics and ﬂexibility of the human notion.
(a) Credential-based computational trust
(i) Inﬂuential systems
Blaze et al. (1996) developed the traditional notion of trust management, and
also developed the ﬁrst prototype trust management system, PolicyMaker. For a
good overview of PolicyMaker and traditional trust management, see Blaze et al.
(1999b). The most general form of proof of compliance (POC) in PolicyMaker
is undecidable and several natural restrictions are NP hard (Blaze et al. 1998).
PolicyMaker considers a version of the POC problem, which requires that all
assertions are monotonic (assertions are fully programmable functions that are
part of credentials). This leads to a restricted notion of POC, which is decidable in
polynomial time (Blaze et al. 1998). KeyNote (Blaze et al. 1999a,c), the successor
of PolicyMaker, restricts the language of assertions to a simple domain-speciﬁc
language so that resource usage is proportional to program size (Blaze et al.
1999b). KeyNote is less general than PolicyMaker but has simpler syntax and
semantics, and requires less computational power. Architectural trade-offs
between PolicyMaker and KeyNote are considered by Blaze et al. (1999c).A
number of applications using PolicyMaker and KeyNote have also been developed
(Blaze et al. 2001, 2002).
DelegationLogic(DL;Lietal.1999,2000,2003)anditsmonotonicversionD1LPis
a language for trust management of credentials, policies and requests; it extends the
logicprogramminglanguageDatalogwithexpressivedelegationconstructs(Li etal.
2003). D1LP is implemented by translation in to ordinary logic programs, which
enables use of existing logic programming technology, e.g. Prolog. An important
feature of DL and D1LP is that the notion of POC is well founded in the roots of
logic. D1LP supports the concepts of authenticated attributes and decentralized
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has a certain attribute (i.e. satisﬁes a certain property, e.g. ‘being a university
student’). D1LP is declarative, expressive and tractable (compliance checking is
polynomial in the size of credentials, policies and requests).
The role-based trust (RT management) framework is a family of languages for
policies and credentials, which combines the strengths of role-based access control
and trust management (Li & Mitchell 2002, 2003b). The RT framework consists of
the languages together with an engine which works by translating credentials into
Datalogrules,similartotheDLlanguages.ThisenablesPOCcheckinginpolynomial
time. Apart from supporting role-based features, Li et al. argue that RT is more
convenient than D1LP although both support attribute-based access control. RT
supports concepts of intersection roles, manifold roles and delegation of role
activation; these enhance the expressive power, compared with other frameworks,
e.g. D1LP (Li & Mitchell 2002). Furthermore, RT supports distributed credentials
and distributed credential discovery (Li & Mitchell 2003b). RT is monotonic and it
has been argued that non-monotonicity requires complete information, which is
unrealistic in distributed systems (Li & Mitchell 2002; Li et al.2 0 0 3 ).
Other examples include SPKI/SDSI (Ellison et al. 1999; Clarke et al. 2001;
Li & Mitchell 2003c), SD3 (Jim 2001) and Binder (DeTreville 2002); the latter
two of which also are based on Datalog. Czenko et al. (2005) present a version
of RT with non-monotonic features. Appel & Felten (1999) use a logic-based
approachtoauthentication.Theirlogicishigherorderandundecidable.Inanalogy
with proof-carrying code, the requester must submit a proof that the request
should be allowed; the proof is then efﬁciently checkable in the framework.
(ii) Fundamental models
The traditional trust management approach was born from an engineering
perspective: important concepts were identiﬁed and prototype systems were
built. Since then the notion of POC (and trust management in general) has
developed and is now better founded on existing theory. We consider just two
formal models that give well-founded notions of POC.
Li & Mitchell (2003a) proposed Constraint Datalog, an extension of Datalog,
as a promising operational foundation for trust management. A number of
existing trust management systems are ‘equivalent’ to a subset of Datalog. Li &
Mitchell (2003a) argued that standard Datalog ‘is not sufﬁciently expressive for
ﬁne-grained control of structured resources’. They show how Datalog can remain
tractable when extended with the so-called linearly decomposable unary
constraint domains, and that permissions associated with structured resources
are expressible within this framework.
Weeks (2001) presents a mathematical framework for trust management
systems based on the existence of least ﬁxed points of monotonic functions on
completelattices.Thisgivesageneralsemanticmodelforthetrustmanagementsys-
tems and the notion of POC; further, it is shown that the general framework can
be instantiated to obtain a number of existing systems, e.g. KeyNote and SPKI.
A great advantage of this approach is that existing theory of ﬁxed points and
algorithms for ﬁxed point computation can be used in trust management engines.
Weeks (2001) shows also how this generality can even lead to more efﬁcient
algorithms for compliance checking.
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We use the term ‘experience based’ to cover the systems and models where an
entity’s trust in another is based, in part, on past behaviour or evaluations of
past behaviour (similar to the human notion of trust). This also covers many
so-called reputation systems or reputation-based trust management systems,
which are often used in peer-to-peer (P2P) and eCommerce applications.
The amount of literature on experience-based trust models, including repu-
tation systems, has quickly grown very extensive. In our view, these systems are
based on a few fundamental principles, and even fewer fundamental models.
Hence, we do not claim to be complete: we focus on the fundamental models,
and only selected examples of systems deploying those models. Also, in the
following we make a number of simpliﬁcations, but stay general enough to
capture most of the principles of existing experience-based systems.
Experience-based trust is based on a set of principals P interacting. Principal p
records its interactions with other principals, so that at each point in time, t,i t
has a set, an interaction history Hist
p(t), consisting of a representation of its
timed interactions in the past with other principals. We write Histp
qðtÞ for the
q-projection, i.e. p’s timed interactions with principal q.
At time t, the sets (Hist
p(t)jp2P)c o n s t i t u t et h edirect data of an experience-
based system at time t.W h e np needs to make a decision at time t, e.g. about
ap r i n c i p a lq,p r i n c i p a lp does this based on information about the direct data
of the system at time t. Usually, this information is incomplete: while p
(often) knows Hist
p(t), the sets Hist
r(t)f o rrsp may not be known exactly.
This may be due to several reasons: p m a yo n l yh a v eH i s t
r(t 0)f o rs o m et 0!t;
when asked about Hist
r(t 0), r may lie; principal p may not be able to obtain
any information about Hist
r(t 0); principal p may only see some abstracted
version Abs(Hist
r(t 0)) of r’s direct data; and any combinations of the
above, etc.
Most experience-based systems work on some abstracted version of the direct
data, denoted AbsHist
p(t). A common example of an abstraction is the following.
At time t, principal p is interested in information about principal q. Each past
interaction is evaluated as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, and time is ignored;
hence, Hist
p(t) is abstracted to a set of pairs (one for each other principal q)
consisting of the number of ‘positive’ interactions and the number of ‘negative’
interactions (with q). p may obtain information about other principals’
interactions with q, and combine the information obtained into a single pair
by adding up the total number of ‘negative’ interactions, and similarly adding up
the total number of ‘positive’ interactions. This example system is much like the
eBay system (www.ebay.com).
In the following, we consider two types of systems: non-probabilistic and
probabilistic.
(i) Non-probabilistic approaches
We use the term concrete reputation systems for experience-based systems
where the sets Hist
p(t) undergo little or no abstraction (Krukow et al. 2005).
Shmatikov & Talcott (2005) deﬁne a concrete reputation system, which is
centred around a notion of ‘licences’. A licence formalizes restrictions and
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terms of certain programmable Boolean functions, taking interaction histories
and other relevant data as input.
Licences are used when principals want to access resources owned by other
principals. The provider of resources p speciﬁes, for each resource r an access
method, which takes as input a licence l, a requester q, and an interaction
history Histp
qðtÞ and outputs a Boolean telling if the agent q can access r with
licence l given the interaction history. The resource owner can specify this
method using any computable function, but typically the owner would check
if the licence permits this use and if it has expired, etc. This gives a
reputation system where decisions are made based on exact criteria on past
histories. Hence, if one can reason about the licence functions and the access
methods, then it is possible to reason about the security guarantees provided
by the system.
Kamvar et al. (2003) present a reputation system for P2P systems, called
EigenTrust (also known as EigenRep), based on the existence of stationary
distributions for Markov chains. In comparison with the framework of
Shmatikov & Talcott, EigenTrust abstracts away more information: each
interaction is evaluated as either ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’, and time is
ignored; each principal p computes a value for other principals q as spqZ
satðp;qÞKunsatðp;qÞ (i.e. the number of interactions between p and q, where p
rated q’s performance as satisfactory minus the number of unsatisfactory ones);
and ﬁnally, these values are then normalized for each peer p (by comparison
with other peers’ performance): cpqZmaxðspq;0Þ=
P
qmaxðspq;0Þ. The normalized
values deﬁne the abstracted histories AbsHistp
qðtÞ, which give rise to a Markov
chain (given by [cpq]) that has a stationary distribution (tq)q2P. This distribution
is computed using an iterative synchronous algorithm; the value tq then represents
the ‘global score’ of q (uniformly for all p).
1
One problem with EigenTrust is that no meaningful semantic interpretation of
the value tq exists (only ‘the larger the better’). Furthermore, temporal aspects
are ignored, and information is thrown away with the normalization. In other
words, it is hard to do formal reasoning about the system.
It should also be mentioned that Stephen Marsh was among the ﬁrst
to formalize a computational human notion of trust in computer science in his
PhD dissertation (Marsh 1994). Abdul-Rahman & Hailes (2000) and Abdul-
Rahman (2005) were was also among the ﬁrst to consider a simpliﬁed practical
model similar to Marsh’s. Xiong & Liu (2004) present PeerTrust featuring a
complex trust metric, but which only has an intuitive justiﬁcation. In our
opinion, these systems exhibit the same problems as EigenTrust: rigorous
reasoning about the past behaviour seems impossible given only the
abstracted information.
(ii) Probabilistic approaches
The probabilistic systems work by assuming a particular probabilistic model,
say l, for the behaviour of principals. The goal is to predict the behaviour of
principals in future interactions, given their behaviour in past interactions and
1This works in a manner similar to Google’s Pagerank.
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goalistocomputeaprobabilityP(‘next’j‘past’,l).Theabstractions,i.e.AbsHist(t),
are then chosen to be as efﬁcient as possible, while preserving as much information
as relevant with respect to the model.
In the following, we shall illustrate our probabilistic trust-based systems using
a simple, but still representative, example of a principal model l, in which each
interaction is observed as being either ‘honest’ or ‘dishonest’. Furthermore, for
each principal q, there is a ﬁxed probability qq2[0,1] of q acting honestly in any
interaction. Note that this assumes that q is always honest with probability qq
independently of any other information we might have (e.g. the time, the past,
interactions with other principals, etc.). The parameters, qq, are unknown and
the goal is to estimate them.
Despotovic & Aberer (2004, 2006) propose a probabilistic system and an
estimation algorithm based on maximum likelihood. In our simple illustrative
model, the algorithm uses a maximum-likelihood procedure, which seeks to ﬁnd
a qq, which maximizes the likelihood expression based on past interactions.
In Despotovic & Aberer (2004, 2006), peers can report to other peers on past
behaviour (and they are allowed to lie in their reports), and the authors also
present an approach based on normal distributions instead of the ﬁxed qq’s.
Similarly, the maximum-likelihood techniques are used to estimate the
parameters of the normal distribution.
Jøsang & Ismail (2002) and Mui et al. (2002) were among the ﬁrst
(independently) to develop reputation systems based on a Bayesian probabilistic
approach with beta priors (for further developments, see Buchegger & Le Boudec
2004; Teacy et al. 2005). In our simple illustrative probabilistic model l
considered above, i.e. with ﬁxed probability qq2[0,1] of principal q acting
honestly in any interaction, the main idea is to represent the current estimate of
the qq’s by probability density functions (pdfs) deﬁned on the interval [0,1], more
speciﬁcally by pdfs from the family Beta(a, b), where the two parameters aO0
and bO0 select a speciﬁc beta distribution from the family. As an example,
Beta(1, 1) represents the uniform pdf. A central observation and idea is that
the beta distributions provide a so-called family of conjugate prior distri-
butions. Furthermore, applying Bayes’ theorem provides an algorithmically very
simple way of computing the posterior pdf from a prior Beta(a, b) and
subsequent observations of h honest and d dishonest interactions with q:
Beta(aCh, bCd).
Jøsang & Ismail (2002), Mui et al. (2002), Buchegger & Le Boudec (2004) and
Teacy et al. (2005) all present systems based on the beta model. Technically, all
the systems work by maintaining for each principal q the two parameters (a, b)
of the current pdf representation of qq, and then estimating qq with the expected
value of Beta(a, b): a/(aCb).
However, the systems (except for Mui et al. (2002) and Teacy et al. (2005))
deviate from the simple model above in the following sense: the parameters (a, b)
are adjusted as time passes, for example, Jøsang uses exponential decay, where a
and b are multiplied by a constant (between 0 and 1) each time parameters are
updated (or a ﬁxed time limit is exceeded). The intuition is that somehow
information about more recent interactions should be considered more important
than information about older interactions.
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probability theory: Yu & Singh (2002) developed a distributed reputation
system, and Jøsang (2001) developed the subjective logic of opinions. Indeed, the
subjective logic is closely linked to the probabilistic beta model (Jøsang 2001).
Finally, there are a number of ‘economic’ reputation system models based on
the theory of games, for example, a ‘reputation effect’ occurs in rational
strategies when modelling interaction as a ﬁnitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game (Kreps & Wilson 1982; Wilson 1985). For a good overview of this area, see
the work of Dellarocas (2003, 2004). The notion of (computational) mechanism
design is also relevant for this area. For mechanism design, see Papadimitriou
(2001) and Feigenbaum & Shenker (2002); with respect to trust and mechanism
design, see Dash et al. (2004).
3. Towards formal computational trust
The main conclusion on our survey above is that although quite a few attempts
towards a formal foundation for computational trust exist, we are still a long way
from a framework allowing us (i) to express and to argue how well a particular
system behaves under various assumptions about the environments (i.e. in which
application scenarios does the system do well?) and (ii) to express and argue
how robust a particular system is with respect to changes in the environment.
In this section, we illustrate a few preliminary attempts towards such a
framework based on ideas from Krukow & Nielsen (2007), Nielsen et al. (2007)
and Sassone et al. (2007).
We focus here on probabilistic computational trust as described above.
Consider, for example, the maximum-likelihood algorithm of Aberer &
Despotovic. Is the algorithm correct? The traditional notion of correctness
would require a proof that the algorithm provided satisﬁes its speciﬁcation in the
traditional sense; in this case, that it actually computes the maximum likelihood.
While this is certainly necessary, what we are more interested in is in which sense
maximum likelihood is ‘the correct’ algorithm to apply, i.e. is the speciﬁcation
‘correct’? In this view, an algorithm can be more or less appropriate depending
on how well it approximates q in the particular chosen probabilistic model. One
can, of course, argue for the usefulness of the algorithm based on experiments
within particular applications, but in the following, we propose an alternative
and formal approach in which to express a new notion of ‘correctness’ addressing
(i) and (ii) above.
More concretely, we shall propose a generic measure to ‘measure’ speciﬁc
probabilistic trust-based systems in a particular environment (i.e. ‘a set of
representative and common conditions’). The measure, which is based on the
so-called Kullback–Leibler divergence, is a measure of how well an algorithm
approximates the ‘true’ probabilistic behaviour of principals.
Consider a probabilistic model of principal behaviour, say l. We consider only
the behaviour of a single ﬁxed principal p, and we consider only algorithms that
attempt to solve the following problem. Suppose we are given an interaction
history X obtained by interacting n times with principal p. Suppose also that
there are m possible outcomes (y1, ., ym) for each interaction. The goal of a
probabilistic trust-based algorithm, say A, is to approximate a distribution on
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AðyijXÞ 2½0;1 ð for all iÞ;
X m
iZ1
AðyijXÞ Z1:
We assume that the probabilistic model, l, deﬁnes the following probabilities:
P(yijX,l), i.e. the probability of ‘yi in the next interaction given a past history of
X’ and P(Xjl), i.e. the ‘a priori probability of observing sequence X in the model’.
Now, ðPðyijX;lÞjiZ1;2;.;mÞ deﬁnes the true distribution on outcomes
for the next interaction (according to the model); by contrast, ðAðyijXÞjiZ
1;2;.;mÞ attempts to approximate this distribution. And clearly, the question
of how well A performs in environments conforming with l now boils down to
how close ðAðyijXÞjiZ1;2;.;mÞ is to ðPðyijX;lÞjiZ1;2;.;mÞ. Probability
theory provides ways of formalizing this, e.g. the Kullback–Leibler divergence
(Kullback & Leibler 1951), which is closely related to Shannon entropy, is a
measure of the distance from a true distribution to an approximation of that
distribution. The Kullback–Leibler divergence from distribution ^ pZðp1;p2;.;
pmÞ to distribution ^ qZðq1;q2;.;qmÞ on a ﬁnite set of m outcomes, is given by
(any log base could be used)
DKLð^ pjj^ qÞ Z
X m
iZ1
pi log2
pi
qi
  
:
Now we have a measure of the ‘quality’ of an output, how can this be
generalized to a measure of the quality of an algorithm A relative to l? For each
n let O
n denote the set of interaction histories of length n. Let us deﬁne, for each
n, the nth expected Kullback–Leibler divergence from l to A:
D
n
KLðljjAÞ Z
ðdefÞ X
X2On
PðXjlÞDKLðPð$jX;lÞjjAð$jXÞÞ:
Note that for each input sequence X2O
n to the algorithm, we evaluate
its performance as DKLðPð$jX;lÞjjAð$jXÞÞ; however, we accept that some
algorithms may perform poorly on very unlikely training sequences, X. Hence,
we weigh the penalty on input X, i.e. DKLðPð$jX;lÞjjAð$jXÞÞ, with the
intrinsic probability of sequence X; that is, we compute the expected Kullback–
Leibler divergence.
Note further that we now have a well-founded framework for addressing
question (i) above: we can use the expected Kullback–Leibler divergence as a
measure of how well a particular algorithm performs relative to a particular
model (i.e. to a range of principal environments).
This framework has been applied by Nielsen et al. (2007) to ask and to answer
formally, for example, the question of comparing the performances of the
maximum-likelihood algorithm of Despotovic & Aberer (2004) and the beta-
based algorithm of Mui et al. (2002) relative to the simple l model introduced
above, i.e. in estimating the ﬁxed probability q of honest behaviour of a
particular principal.
Nielsen et al. (2007) also illustrate how the approach addresses question
(ii) above. The two algorithms are generalized to a continuum of algorithms, and
it is shown that among this continuum of algorithms, the beta-based algorithm of
Mui et al. (2002) is optimal for precisely qZ1=2G1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
12
p
. And it follows from the
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of q, and hence that we can formalize a notion of robustness of the quality of the
beta-based algorithm of Mui et al. (2002) around the particular q value above.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have been discussing the role of trust in UbiComp. We believe
that trust could be an important ingredient in meeting the UbiComp Grand
Challenge, but as stated in Sloman (2006): ‘A discipline of trust will only be
effective if it is rigorously deﬁned’. We have argued for the need of models as a
foundation for asking and answering questions on the performance of systems in
computational trust, and we have introduced a few preliminary ideas towards
this ambitious goal (for simple probabilistic models).
In doing so, we have followed the view of Samuel Karlin: that the purpose of
models is maybe not to ﬁt the data, but rather to sharpen the questions. But
good models must do both, and clearly the probabilistic models we have been
advocating here need a lot of further improvements in order to be more realistic.
For example, the beta model of principal behaviour (which we consider to be
state-of-the-art) assumes that for each principal p there is a single ﬁxed parameter
qpsoateachinteraction,independentlyofanythingelseweknow, there is probability
qp for a ‘good’ outcome and probability 1Kqp for a ‘bad’ outcome. For some
applications, one might argue that this is unrealistic, for example, (i) the parameter
qp is ﬁxed, independent of time and (ii) p’s behaviour when interacting with us is
likely to depend on our behaviour when interacting with p.
As mentioned above, some beta-based reputation systems attempt to deal
with the ﬁrst problem by introducing notions of ‘decaying’. The idea is that
information about old interactions should weigh less than information about new
ones; however, this represents a departure from the probabilistic beta model,
where all interactions ‘weigh the same’. Since a new model is not introduced, i.e.
to formalize this preference towards newer information, it is not clear what the
exact beneﬁts of forgetting factors are, and more generally when and why to
choose between, for example, exponential decay as opposed to say linear decay?
Nielsen et al. (2007) propose preliminary ideas following the spirit of this paper
are introduced, formally modelling the dynamic behaviour of a principal by a
hidden Markov model.
The notion of context is also relevant for computational trust models, as has
been recognized by many. Given a single-context model, one can obtain a multi-
context model by instantiating the single-context model in each context.
However, as Sierra & Sabater (2005) argue, this is too naive: the goal of a true
multi-context model is not just to model multiple contexts, but to provide the
basis for transferring information from one context to another related context.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no techniques dealing formally with this
problem within the ﬁeld of trust and reputation.
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